



Beyond Bobby Jo Clary: The Unavailability of 
Same-Sex Marital Privileges Infringes the Rights 
of so Many More Than Criminal Defendants 
Katharine T. Schaffzin 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps too much has been written about the hypothetical scenario of 
a lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender criminal defendant being 
sentenced to death on the testimony of his or her same-sex spouse 
because a court determined that the marriage obtained validly in another 
jurisdiction was not a valid marriage in the current jurisdiction, rendering 
the marital privileges inapplicable.1  Actual case law on this subject does 
not exist, leading one to question the importance of speculation on an 
issue that has never arisen.  With current speculation that the Supreme 
Court of the United States will mandate marriage equality at some point 
in the near future,2 it seems futile to continue to hypothesize about the  
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 1.  See, e.g., Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & W. James Denvil, Availability of Spousal Privileges for 
Same-Sex Couples, 11 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 224, 239 (2011); Maria A. 
La Vita, Note, When the Honeymoon is Over: How a Federal Court’s Denial of the Spousal 
Privilege to a Legally Married Same-Sex Couple Can Result in the Incarceration of a Spouse Who 
Refuses to Adversely Testify, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 261 (2007). 
 2.  See, e.g., Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 997525, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 
14, 2014) (“At this point, all signs indicate that, in the eyes of the United States Constitution, the 
plaintiffs’ marriages will be placed on an equal footing with those of heterosexual couples and that 
proscriptions against same-sex marriage will soon become a footnote in the annals of American 
history.”); Steve Sanders, Is the Full Faith and Credit Clause Still “Irrelevant” to Same-Sex 
Marriage?: Toward a Reconsideration of the Conventional Wisdom, 89 IND. L.J. 95, 99–100 (2014) 
(implying that constitutionally mandated marriage equality is inevitable, but noting that it is still 
“some years off”). 
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effect of marriage inequality on potential lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender criminal defendants. 
One recent case, however, has come close to raising the previously 
hypothetical issue and sheds light on the fact that the denial of marital 
privileges to same-sex spouses has significant repercussions for all same-
sex couples in the United States.3  In August 2013, a Kentucky trial court 
heard arguments in Kentucky v. Clary on the applicability of Kentucky’s 
spousal testimony privilege where the relationship between Bobby Jo 
Clary, the criminal defendant charged with murder,4 and Geneva Case, a 
witness subpoenaed by the prosecution,5 constituted a civil union 
celebrated in Vermont before that state began issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples.6  Defense counsel argued that a Kentucky 
                                                          
 3.  See Kentucky v. Clary, No. 11-CR-3329 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013), available at 
http://img1.wikia.nocookie.net/__cb20130924152729/marriage/images/6/65/Commonwealth_v._Cla
ry_Order_2013-09-23.pdf (order denying witness’ motion to quash the Commonwealth’s subpoena 
requiring her to testify against her same-sex partner, who was being tried for murder, and the 
defendant-partner’s motion to invoke the marital privilege). 
 4.  On October 30, 2011, Louisville Metro Police discovered the body of 64-year-old George 
Murphy dead in his Kentucky home.  POLICE: Louisville Woman Killed Man, Stole Truck, 
WDRB.COM, http://www.wdrb.com/story/15913998/police-louisville-woman-killed-man-stole-
truck?clienttype=printable (last updated Nov. 01, 2011).  The Jefferson County Coroner concluded 
that he “died of injuries to his head, neck, and extremities” inflicted during an assault.  Id.  Police 
arrested Bobbie Jo Clary, a family friend of Murphy’s, for his murder and the subsequent theft of his 
truck.  Id. 
 5.  According to prosecutors, Clary recounted the events surrounding Murphy’s death to her 
partner, Geneva Case.  Clary, No. 11-CR-3329 at 1.  Accordingly, the Jefferson County Prosecutor’s 
Office subpoenaed Case to testify at Clary’s trial.  Id.  Clary invoked Kentucky’s spousal testimony 
privilege and Case moved to quash the subpoena in light of that same privilege.  Id. at 1–2.  
Kentucky’s spousal testimony privilege is statutorily defined as Kentucky’s “Husband-wife 
privilege,” which includes: 
 
(a) Spousal testimony.  The spouse of a party has a privilege to refuse to testify against 
the party as to events occurring after the date of their marriage.  A party has a privilege to 
prevent his or her spouse from testifying against the party as to events occurring after the 
date of their marriage.   
 
KY. R. EVID. 504(a). 
 6.  Clary, No. 11-CR-3329 at 2 (quoting KY. R. EVID. 504(a)).  At a hearing on the motion to 
quash the subpoena, the Jefferson County Prosecutor’s Office took the position that Kentucky’s 
marital privileges do not apply to same-sex couples.  See Colleen Curry, Lesbian May Be Forced to 
Testify Against Wife, ABC NEWS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/lesbian-woman-forced-
testify-wifes-murder-trial/print?id=19828792.  Vermont granted a civil union to the couple in 2004, 
before that State recognized same-sex marriages.  Clary, No. 11-CR-3329 at 4.  Prosecutors relied 
on the State’s mini-DOMA—a constitutional amendment passed by referendum in 2004 prohibiting 
the State from recognizing same-sex marriages or civil unions celebrated in other jurisdictions—in 
support of its position.  See Curry, supra.  The pertinent constitutional provision provides that 
“[o]nly a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in 
Kentucky.  A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried 
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constitutional amendment—providing that the State would not recognize 
marriages between same-sex individuals whether validly celebrated in 
another state or not (known as a “mini-DOMA”)—was unconstitutional.7  
However, the trial judge did not reach that issue, denying the 
applicability of spousal immunity instead because the defendant and the 
witness were not validly married, even in Vermont; rather, they had a 
civil union.8  While the facts of the Clary case do not fulfill the dreams 
of those authors discussing such hypotheticals,9 they came closer than 
ever before. 
Clary may be a dead end for the argument that hypothetical lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender criminal defendants need protection from 
the possibility that their same-sex spouses from marriages validly 
celebrated in a state other than that in which they are on trial will be 
forced to reveal damning evidence on the stand, possibly leading to 
conviction and likely resulting in the destruction of the marriage.  The 
fact that such cases have simply failed to materialize demonstrates that 
the risk of such a scenario is extremely low.10  Nonetheless, the effect of 
                                                          
individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”  KY. CONST. §233A, invalidated by Love v. Beshear, 
989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014).  Notably, the Kentucky Attorney General’s Office 
declined a request from the circuit court judge to argue on behalf of prosecutors.  See Associated 
Press, Ky. AG Staying Out of Same Sex Privilege Issue, WUKY.ORG (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.wuky.org/post/ky-ag-staying-out-same-sex-privilege-issue. 
 7.  See Curry, supra note 6.  Kentucky recognizes both marital privileges.  KY. R. EVID. 504.  
Rule 504 provides: 
 
(a) Spousal testimony.  The spouse of a party has a privilege to refuse to testify against 
the party as to events occurring after the date of their marriage.  A party has a privilege to 
prevent his or her spouse from testifying against the party as to events occurring after the 
date of their marriage. 
(b) Marital communications.  An individual has a privilege to refuse to testify and to 
prevent another from testifying to any confidential communication made by the 
individual to his or her spouse during their marriage.  The privilege may be asserted only 
by the individual holding the privilege or by the holder’s guardian, conservator, or 
personal representative.  A communication is confidential if it is made privately by an 
individual to his or her spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person.  
 
Id.  Notably, for comparison’s sake, Kentucky recognizes common law marriages celebrated outside 
Kentucky as valid marriages, although it does not recognize common law marriages celebrated 
within the State.  See Curry, supra note 6. 
 8.  Clary, No. 11-CR-3329 at 6. 
 9.  Cf., e.g., Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 1, at 229–57 (providing hypotheses and 
discussion about the availability of marital privileges); La Vita, supra note 1, at 261 (“if evidence 
derived from marital communications is allowed and weighs heavily toward a conviction, a same-
sex spouse may be convicted and incarcerated in a circumstance where she may not have been if the 
evidence was privileged”). 
 10.  Although, arguably, the risk increases as the number of valid same-sex marriages 
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inconsistent marriage laws on the application of marital privileges is real 
and arguably affects every same-sex spouse in the United States.11  These 
effects are magnified by the growing number of same-sex spouses in 
America.12 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender criminal defendants who 
spill the beans to their same-gender spouses are not the only citizens 
affected by a state’s refusal to apply marital privileges to same-sex 
spouses.  In fact, every same-sex spouse in the United States is adversely 
affected by the application of laws refusing to recognize the validity of a 
same-sex marriage celebrated in another state to deny them marital 
privileges.13  This is because the risk of denial of an evidentiary privilege 
in one state would have a chilling effect on the behavior the privilege is 
intended to protect in the state celebrating the marriage.14  The lack of 
certainty over whether the marital privileges will be applied across state 
lines would prevent one same-sex spouse in certain circumstances from 
openly communicating with the other for fear that such communications 
will be revealed in court.15  Thus, the privilege protected in one state is 
defeated in the next.16  And the behavior protected by the privilege in one 
state will be curtailed for fear of compelled testimony in another state.17  
Essentially, one state’s laws refusing to recognize valid same-sex 
marriages have the effect of partially invalidating the laws of another 
state celebrating marriage equality.18 
With the number of states celebrating same-sex marriage growing 
almost monthly,19 the number of those affected by the denial of marital 
privileges continues to grow exponentially.  Many states, however, 
continue to support their statutes and constitutional amendments 
reaffirming their rights to refuse to recognize as valid a same-sex 
marriage obtained validly in another state.20  Kentucky’s mini-DOMA, 
                                                          
celebrated across the country rises.  See infra Part II.  However, the risk will be eliminated if the 
Supreme Court of the United States mandates marriage equality. 
 11.  See infra Part V. 
 12.  See infra Part II. 
 13.  See infra Part V.  Unless, of course, both spouses avoided minimum contacts with any state 
refusing to recognize the validity of their marriage. 
 14.  See infra Part V. 
 15.  See infra Part V.B. 
 16.  See infra Part V.B. 
 17.  See infra Part V.B. 
 18.  See infra Part V.B. 
 19.  See infra Part II. 
 20.  See, e.g., Virginia: Bostic v. Schaefer, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedom 
tomarry.org/litigation/entry/virginia  (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (reporting that on February 24, 
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like that in many states, is backed up by a similar provision in the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).21  Although § 3 of DOMA was 
deemed unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor,22 § 2—the 
provision allowing states to define marriage based on the gender of those 
entering into it—was not discussed in that case and remains good law.  In 
§ 2, DOMA provides: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a 
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or 
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.23 
The reality that the Supreme Court has struck § 3 as unconstitutional 
while § 2 persists creates a tension that has not yet been resolved. 
This article explores the impact of § 2 of DOMA and mini-DOMAs 
on the actions of same-sex spouses in their home states, which would be 
protected from disclosure in those states, but which may be ordered 
revealed by a foreign court with a mini-DOMA.24  For example, it will 
explore how a mini-DOMA in Texas may inhibit the lawful and 
protected actions of same-sex spouses in New York, and why that result 
defeats the intent of lawmakers in New York.25  Part II presents an 
                                                          
2014, defendants in Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, Bostic v. Schaefer, 
Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. Jul. 28, 2014), filed an appeal from 
order striking Virginia’s mini-DOMA as unconstitutional, in which the Fourth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the mini-DOMA was unconstitutional); Joseph Lord, 
Kentucky Gov. Steve Beshear to Appeal Federal Judge’s Same-Sex Marriage Order, WFPL NEWS 
(Mar. 4, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://wfpl.org/post/kentucky-gov-steve-beshear-appeal-federal-judges-
same-sex-marriage-order (reporting that Kentucky governor intends to appeal from the decision in 
Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014) striking Kentucky’s mini-DOMA as 
unconstitutional); Oklahoma: Bishop v. Smith, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedom 
tomarry.org/litigation/entry/oklahoma (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (reporting that Oklahoma filed an 
appeal on January 16, 2014, from the decision in Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. 
Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003, 14-5006, 2014 WL 
3537847 (10th Cir. 2014) striking Oklahoma’s mini-DOMA as unconstitutional); Utah: Kitchen v. 
Herbert, FREEDOM TO MARRY , http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation/entry/utah (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2014) (reporting that Utah appealed from order striking Utah’s mini-DOMA as 
unconstitutional in Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 
(10th Cir. 2014)). 
 21.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012), invalidated in part by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
 22.  133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 23.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
 24.  See infra Part V. 
 25.  See infra Part V.B. 
SCHAFFZIN_FINAL_PUBLICATION.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:50 AM 
108 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
overview of the quickly changing landscape of same-sex marriage in the 
United States.26  Next, Part III explains marital privileges generally, 
focusing on the confidential marital communications privilege, the 
spousal testimony privilege, and the role of Federal Rule of Evidence 
501 in applying those privileges.27  Part IV addresses the applicability of 
marital privileges in federal court since the Supreme Court’s 2013 
decision in United States v. Windsor.28  Part V assesses the inequality of 
the marital privileges afforded to same-sex couples when compared to 
opposite-sex couples under § 2 of DOMA, as well as mini-DOMAs.29  
Part VI suggests the options available to correct the disparities between 
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples in exercising the benefits 
associated with marital privileges, including a uniform marital privilege 
and intervention by the Supreme Court.30  Part VI includes an 
explanation and assessment of available constitutional arguments 
challenging DOMA § 2 and mini-DOMAs, including equal protection, 
substantive due process, and comity.31  Finally, Part VII concludes that 
the unequal application of marital privileges to same-sex spouses renders 
DOMA § 2 and states’ mini-DOMAs unconstitutional, requiring action 
from the Supreme Court to ensure the uniformity needed to allow same-
sex spouses to fully enjoy the benefits of marriage conferred upon them 
by the laws of the state of their marriage celebration.32 
II. A GROWING POPULATION 
The state of same-sex marriages has changed drastically since the 
demise of § 3 of the federal DOMA, which limited the federal definition 
of marriage to one man and one woman, in the now infamous 2013 case 
of United States v. Windsor.33  But long before Edith Windsor had her 
day in court, the United States was facing a turn in the way individuals 
viewed the fundamental right to marry.  One of the first cases dealing 
with same-sex couples’ right to marry, Baker v. Nelson,34 resulted in an 
                                                          
 26.  See infra Part II. 
 27.  See infra Part III. 
 28.  See infra Part IV. 
 29.  See infra Part V. 
 30.  See infra Part VI. 
 31.  See infra Part VI. 
 32.  See infra Part VII. 
 33.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 34.  191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
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unceremonious dismissal by the Supreme Court,35 which has been long 
cited by both those in opposition and support of same-sex marriages.36  
In 1971, Richard John Baker and James Michael McConnell, a gay 
couple, applied to a court clerk in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for a 
marriage license.37  The couple was turned away because state law 
limited marriages to persons of the opposite sex.38  The couple argued 
that the United States Constitution protected a fundamental right to 
marry.39  A judge in Minnesota disagreed with the couple and instead 
concluded that the clerk was not required to issue a marriage license to 
the couple.40  The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld that ruling, asserting 
that “marriage [i]s a union of man and woman” in an institution “as old 
as the book of Genesis.”41  Most notably, the Supreme Court dismissed 
the appeal with this one-sentence order: “The appeal is dismissed for 
want of a substantial federal question.”42 
In stark contrast to 1971, today some same-sex couples enjoy explicit 
rights and protections in a growing number of states.  Unfortunately, 
there is no hard or fast rule governing the extent of rights enjoyed by 
same-sex couples; some states allow same-sex couples rights equal to 
heterosexual couples to marry, while others allow more limited 
recognition of same-sex marriages.43  Twenty states and the District of 
Columbia recognize same sex marriages,44 one state recognizes civil 
                                                          
 35.  See Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. 
 36.  Lyle Denniston, Gay Marriage and Baker v. Nelson, SCOTUSBLOG (July 4, 2012, 4:52 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/gay-marriage-and-baker-v-nelson/ (“The precedent is 
considered to be fully binding even now by opponents of same-sex marriage, but of only limited 
impact—at most—by advocates of such marriages.”). 
 37.  Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 186. 
 40.  Id. at 185. 
 41.  Id. at 186. 
 42.  Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 43.  Compare Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968–70 (Mass. 2003) 
(holding that the Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriages violated individual liberty and equality 
safeguards of the Massachusetts Constitution, and thus invalidating the ban), with WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 770.001 (West 2013) (establishing domestic partnerships and stating that a domestic partnership 
“is not substantially similar to [the status] of marriage”). 
 44. Those states recognizing same-sex marriage include: California, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20a (West 2014); District of 
Columbia, D.C. CODE § 46-401 (Supp. 2014); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (West Supp. 
2014); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (West Supp.  2013); Illinois, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/201 (West 2009); Iowa, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Maine, ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650-A (Supp. 2013); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 
Supp. 2013); Massachusetts, Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941; Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §517.01 
 
SCHAFFZIN_FINAL_PUBLICATION.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:50 AM 
110 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
unions,45 and four states recognize domestic partnerships and some 
protections enjoyed by heterosexual married couples.46  Twelve states 
have stayed rulings to allow same-sex marriages pending appeals.47 
The status of marriage equality across the nation changes every day 
with each new court that addresses the issue.  For example, on Friday, 
March 14, 2014, the United States District Court for the Middle District 
                                                          
(West Supp. 2014); Oregon, Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); New 
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §457:1-a (Supp. 2013); New Jersey, Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 
82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013); New Mexico, Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 
2013); New York, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014); Pennsylvania, Whitewood 
v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-1 (West 
Supp. 2014); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West Supp. 2013); Virginia, Bostic v. Schaefer, 
Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014); Washington, WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (West Supp. 2014). 
 45.  Colorado provides for civil unions. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-15-102 (West Supp. 
2013). 
 46.  Those states recognizing domestic partnerships and some of the privileges enjoyed by 
opposite-sex married couples are: Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 122A.100 to .510 (West 2013); 
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.340 (West Supp. 2014); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 26.60.030 (West Supp. 2014) (altered in 2012 to make domestic partnerships available if at least 
one partner is sixty-two or older); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 770.001, 770.05 (West Supp. 
2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West Supp. 2013). 
 47.  Arkansas, Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1908815 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 
9, 2014) (holding Arkansas’ constitutional amendment discriminatory and allowing same-sex 
marriages; stayed pending State’s appeal); Colorado, Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RM-
KLM, 2014 WL 3634834 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014) (pending the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals); 
Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-CV-32572, 2014 WL 3408024 (D. Colo. July 9, 2014) (ruling in state 
court in favor of same-sex marriages, stayed by the Colorado Supreme Court pending appeal to be 
heard later this year); Florida, Brenner v. Scott, Nos. 4:14cv107-RH/CAS, 4:14cv138-RH/CAS, 
2014 WL 4113100 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) (pending appeal to the Tenth Circuit); Idaho, Latta v. 
Otter, No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014) (pending appeal of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguments set to be heard Sept. 8, 2014); Indiana, Baskin v. Bogan, 
No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB1:14-cv-00404-RLY-TAB, 1:14-cv-00406-RLY-MJD, 2014 WL 
2884868 (S.D. Ind. June 25, 2014), aff’d, Nos. 14-2386, 14-2387, 14-2388, 14-2526, 2014 WL 
4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court); Kentucky, 
Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) (pending 
appeal of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Kentucky Attorney General refused to defend the 
constitutional ban and Kentucky Governor hired private counsel to defend); Michigan, DeBoer v. 
Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (pending appeal of the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals); Oklahoma, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003, 14-5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 
18, 2014) (upholding the district court’s striking the unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriages, the 
10th Circuit Court of Appeals has issued a stayed pending appeal of the United States Supreme 
Court); Tennessee, Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 
2014) (order granting preliminary injunction, pending appeal of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals); 
Texas, De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (pending appeal of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals); Utah, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (Tenth Circuit affirmed 
Utah district court’s invalidation of same-sex marriage ban pending disposition of writ of certiorari); 
Wisconsin, Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64-bbc, 2014 WL 2693963 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2014), aff’d, 
Baskin, 2014 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (pending appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court). 
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of Tennessee issued an injunction against the state’s ban on same-sex 
marriage to recognize the marriages of three same-sex couples validly 
married in states that celebrate same-sex marriages.48  Judge Aleta A. 
Trauger noted in her order that, “[a]t this point, all signs indicate that, in 
the eyes of the United States Constitution, the plaintiffs’ marriages will 
be placed on an equal footing with those of heterosexual couples and that 
proscriptions against same-sex marriage will soon become a footnote in 
the annals of American history.”49  While this historical injunction is not 
unique, it does draw the question of what rights legally married 
individuals of one state will receive in another that might not recognize 
their marriage. 
While it does seem inevitable at this point that the Supreme Court 
will eventually take action to mandate marriage equality, the issue of 
marriage inequity remains pertinent because the Court has already 
“ducked the issue” of the constitutionality of § 2 of DOMA in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,50 and Justice Sotomayor has “indicated she 
might prefer to let the question of state gay marriage laws ‘perk’ for a 
while longer in the lower courts.”51  Because universal marriage equality 
may be years off, the discussion of the implications of non-uniform state 
laws on same-sex marriage post-Windsor remains relevant.52 
III. MARITAL PRIVILEGES 
All state and federal courts recognize a marital privilege in one form 
or another.53  These privileges are reserved to those who have either 
currently or previously entered into a valid marriage.54  As evidenced in 
                                                          
 48.  Tanco, 2014 WL 997525, at *9 (order granting preliminary injunction).  See also Heidi 
Hall, Judge recognizes gay marriages of 3 Tennessee couples, USA TODAY (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/14/gay-marriage-tennessee-lawsuit/6432547/. 
 49.  Tanco, 2014 WL 997525, at *9. 
 50.  See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (deciding the case on standing 
grounds). 
 51.  Sanders, supra note 2, at 100.   
 52.  See id. (discussing importance of same-sex marriage rights and privileges given that 
“constitutionally mandated marriage equality. . . is some years off”).   
 53.  See infra notes 63, 86 and accompanying text. 
 54.  To apply, each privilege requires a valid marriage; in determining if a marital privilege will 
apply, “[a] trial court must first determine whether a spouse could assert a marital privilege. . . . 
Then, because only a spouse may assert the privilege, the court determines whether the party or 
witness qualifies as a spouse.”  Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 1, at 237.  See also Sally A. 
Roberts, Spousal Privileges: “Honey, the Judge Says We’re History!”, THE LAW OFFICES OF SALLY 
A. ROBERTS, LLC, http://www.sallyrobertslegal.com/personal-injury-articles.htm (last visited Sept. 
20, 2014) (discussing martial privileges and their application).   
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Part II, what constitutes a valid marriage is a fairly unpredictable 
question these days that depends on who you ask and where he is 
standing.55  Who is entitled to exercise a marital privilege—and where—
is similarly unpredictable. 
Evidentiary rules are constructed to aid the fact finder in discovering 
the truth.56  Privileges are antithetical to this endeavor.  Specifically, 
privileges protect from disclosure relevant, otherwise admissible 
evidence that may bring a jury closer to the truth.57  The purpose of 
obstructing that search for the truth with an evidentiary privilege is to 
protect some other public interest deemed more important than the 
discovery of the truth.58  Thus, for a variety of public policy reasons, a 
number of evidentiary privileges have evolved, including marital 
privileges.  There are two marital privileges and they both focus on 
protecting the relationship between spouses: the spousal testimony 
privilege and the confidential marital communications privilege.59 
Both marital privileges require a valid marriage as a pre-requisite to 
their application.60  Because, like all evidentiary privileges, marital 
privileges are “in derogation of the truth, . . . the ‘valid marriage’ 
requirement must be interpreted strictly.”61  Nonetheless, the public 
                                                          
 55.  See supra Part II. 
 56.  See Roberts, supra note 54, at 1. 
 57.  See id.  
 58.  See id. at 1–2 (citing Kimberly A. Connor, A Critique of the Marital Privileges: An 
Examination of the Marital Privileges in the United States Military Through the State and Federal 
Approaches to the Marital Privileges, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 131 (2001)).   
 59.  See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1365 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the two 
privileges); United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Lustig, 
555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977) (same). 
 60.  See, e.g., Knox, 124 F.3d at 1365; Acker, 52 F.3d at 515; Lustig, 555 F.2d at 747 (citing 
United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Neeley, 475 F.2d 
1136, 1137 (4th Cir. 1973)). 
 61.  Acker, 52 F.3d at 515 (citing United States v. Hamilton, 19 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1994)).  
See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (“[privileges] must be strictly 
construed”).  In Acker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the refusal 
of the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina to recognize defendant 
Catherine Acker’s assertion of either the spousal testimony privilege or the confidential marital 
communications privilege.  52 F.3d at 515.  In that case, Acker was convicted of bank robbery after 
Samuel Holly, the man with whom Acker had cohabitated for twenty-five years prior to her 
conviction, testified against her as part of his own plea agreement.  Id. at 512.  Acker’s assertion of 
the marital privileges was based on her argument that the court should recognize their common law 
marriage.  Id. at 514.  The Fourth Circuit looked first to the laws of New York and North Carolina, 
the only states in which the couple resided throughout their relationship.  Id.  Because neither state 
recognized common law marriage, the court determined that Acker and Holly were not validly 
married.  Id. at 514–15.  The court denied Acker’s argument that it should look to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend to her common law marriage “the same 
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policies of preserving marital harmony and protecting the intimate nature 
of marital communications are generally seen to outweigh the 
consequence of excluding otherwise admissible evidence from the fact 
finder.62  Because the confidential marital communications privilege and 
the spousal testimony privilege protect a public policy viewed to 
outweigh even a court’s search for the truth, these privileges are rather 
significant. 
A. The Confidential Marital Communications Privilege 
All state and federal jurisdictions in the United States recognize the 
confidential marital communications privilege in some form.63  This 
privilege protects from disclosure intimately shared communications 
                                                          
rights and privileges that are extended to married individuals in federal courts.”  Id. at 514.  The 
court continued that “reason dictates that before the courts extend a marital privilege to benefit a 
defendant, the defendant must have assumed both the privileges and responsibilities of a valid 
marriage under the law of the state in which the privilege is asserted.”  Id. at 515.  Interestingly, the 
Fourth Circuit looked to the laws of the state in which the privilege was asserted as well as the laws 
of the states in which the couple had resided throughout the entirety of their relationship.  Id. at 514.  
 62.  See, e.g., Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 1, at 229–31 (citations omitted) (explaining that 
marital harmony and confidences served as the foundation of the marital privileges); La Vita, supra 
note 1, at 261 (citing Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934)) (“Courts have long recognized 
marital communications as privileged because the preservation of marriage outweighs the 
disadvantages imposed in excluding the evidence.”).  
 63.  ALA. R. EVID. 504; ALASKA R. EVID. 505; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2231 to -2232 
(Supp. 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (2010); ARK. R. EVID. 504; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 
970–973, 980–987 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(a) (West 2014); State v. 
Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 1173 (Conn. 2004); DEL. R. EVID. 504; D.C. CODE § 14-306 (Supp. 2014); 
FLA. STAT. § 90.504 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-501 to 5-503 (West 2013); HAW. R. EVID. 
505; IDAHO R. EVID. 504; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-801 (West 2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/115-16 (West Supp. 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(4) (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
622.9 (West  2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-423(b) (West Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428 
(West Supp. 2008); KY. R. EVID. 504; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. § 504–505 (2014); ME. R. EVID. 504; 
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 9-105 to -106 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, 
§ 20 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 
(West  Supp. 2014); MISS. R. EVID. 504; MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 26-1-802 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-505 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.295 
(West 2004); N.H.R. EVID. 504; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-17, -22 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38-6-6 (West 2010); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-56 to -57 
(West Supp. 2013); N.D.R. EVID. 504; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.02, 2945.42 (West Supp. 
2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2504 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.255 (West 2003); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913, 5915, 5923–24 (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-17-13 
(West Supp.  2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-12 to -15 
(2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201 (West 2002); TEX. R. EVID. 504; UTAH R. EVID. 502; VT. 
STAT ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (West Supp. 2014); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West Supp. 2014); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 57-3-4 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West Supp. 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1-12-104 (West 2007). 
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between spouses.64  It “bars testimony concerning intra-spousal, 
confidential expressions arising from the marital relationship.”65  The 
privilege covers only communications.66  Moreover, the communication 
must have been made privately.67  Essentially, it enables married couples 
to discuss everything from dirty laundry to pillow talk without fear that 
such conversations will later become public.  To ensure the ongoing 
maintenance of such confidentiality, it may be asserted by either spouse 
to prevent even a willing spouse-witness from testifying adversely to the 
party-spouse’s interests.68 
The public policy behind the confidential marital communications 
privilege is to preserve the intimacy of marital communications.69  In 
Stein v. Bowman, the United States Supreme Court explained the 
significance of the privilege in federal common law as follows: “To 
break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of 
husband and wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human 
existence.”70  So important is this policy that the confidential marital 
communications privilege even survives the termination of the 
marriage.71  This privilege makes certain one’s ability to relieve herself 
from her burdens in the moment, knowing they will remain private even 
if the marriage later fails. 
The confidential marital communications privilege can be traced 
back to Sexton v. Sexton, decided in 1905 by the Supreme Court of 
Iowa.72  The Court in Sexton described the origins and nature of the 
privilege as follows: 
                                                          
 64.  See Acker, 52 F.3d at 514 (“The ‘marital communication privilege,’ if applicable and 
properly raised, is with the defendant and prevents a spouse from testifying against the defendant 
regarding confidential communications between the spouses.”). 
 65.  Lustig, 555 F.2d at 747 (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951); United 
States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 66.  See id. at 748 (citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); United States v. Smith, 
533 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1976)) (“It is well established that the privilege applies only to 
utterances or expressions intended by one spouse to convey a message to the other.”).  
 67.  See id. (citing Pereira, 347 U.S. at 6–7; United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 434 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972)) (“Communications made to or in the presence of third parties are not intended to be 
confidential and are not privileged.”).  Marital communications, however, receive a presumption of 
confidentiality.  Blau, 340 U.S. at 333 (citing Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934)). 
 68.  Acker, 52 F.3d at 514. 
 69.  See Roberts, supra note 54 (discussing the history and public policy behind the spousal 
immunity privilege). 
 70.  38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839). 
 71.  Lustig, 555 F.2d at 747 (citing Pereira, 347 U.S. at 6; United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 
1146, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
 72.  105 N.W. 314 (Iowa 1905). 
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The privilege of communications between husband and wife, was 
secured at common law. The rule was not designed to suppress truth, 
but had its origin in the fact, made clear by experience, that greater 
mischiefs resulted from the admission of such evidence than were 
likely to arise from its exclusion. In common, therefore, with other 
privileges, analogous in character, it was grounded on public policy. In 
stating the reasons for the privilege Mr. Greenleaf says: “The happiness 
of the married state requires that there should be the most unlimited 
confidence between husband and wife, and this confidence the law 
secures by providing that it shall be kept forever inviolable; that 
nothing shall be extracted from the bosom of the wife which was there 
confided by her husband.”73 
Citing the Iowa Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sexton, the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Wolfle v. United States stated: “The basis of the 
immunity given to communications between husband and wife is the 
protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the 
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the 
disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege 
entails.”74  In Wolfle, the Supreme Court further explained that the 
existence of the confidential marital communications privilege should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.75 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize the 
confidential marital communications privilege in some form,76 even if 
those states may not also recognize the spousal immunity privilege.77  
Those states that recognize confidential marital communications but not 
spousal immunity reason that the purpose of preserving marital harmony 
is sufficiently served through the former; the latter being viewed as an 
unnecessary extension and perhaps an unnecessary obstruction to the 
truth.78 
When the United States Supreme Court promulgated the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1972, however, it intentionally omitted the 
confidential marital communications privilege traditionally recognized 
                                                          
 73.  Id. at 315 (citing 1 GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 254). 
 74.  291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (citing Sexton, 105 N.W. at 315; Hammons v. State, 84 S.W. 718, 
720 (Ark. 1905); O’Toole v. Ohio Ger. Fire Ins. Co., 123 N.W. 795, 797 (Mich. 1909)). 
 75.  See id. (distinguishing between communications that were intended to be private and 
communications made in the presence of a third person to determine the applicability of the 
privilege).  
 76.  See supra note 63. 
 77.  See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 78.  See Mikah K. Story, Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital 
Communications Privilege to Electronic Mail, 58 S.C. L. REV. 275, 278–83 (2006) (discussing 
criticism concerning the communications privilege). 
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under federal common law.79  The Supreme Court took the opposite view 
of those states that prefer the confidential marital communications 
privilege to the spousal testimony privilege when it suggested preserving 
the spousal testimony privilege in Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 
505 while rejecting the confidential marital communications privilege.80  
In drafting Proposed Rule 505, the Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence reasoned that spousal immunity is inclusive of most 
scenarios that would include divulgence of confidential marital 
communications, rendering a marital communications privilege 
superfluous.81  Recognizing that federal common law already maintained 
a confidential marital communications privilege, Congress criticized 
Proposed Rule 505 as a “conscious decision of the Court to narrow its 
[husband-wife privilege] scope from that recognized under present 
Federal decisions.”82  Much of the Congressional criticism was aimed at 
the extreme disparity between many states’ privilege laws—all fifty 
states recognized the confidential marital communications privilege83—
and the proposed rule.84  Because Proposed Rule 505 was never enacted, 
however, the confidential marital communications privilege persists at 
federal common law.85 
B. Spousal Testimony Privilege 
A majority of jurisdictions in the United States also recognize some 
form of the spousal testimony privilege, often referred to as spousal 
                                                          
 79.  See Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege. 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1369 
(1973) (providing the Advisory Committee’s reasoning for excluding the communications privilege).  
 80.  See, e.g., Development in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 
1565 (1985) (“many state legislatures recognized the need for distinct protection of confidential 
marital communications”); Kimberly Ann Connor, A Critique of the Marital Privileges: An 
Examination of the Marital Privileges in the United States Military Through the State and Federal 
Approaches to the Marital Privileges, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 135–38 (2001) (asserting that the 
communications privilege “stemmed from the state legislatures’ recognition of the need for the 
explicit protection of confidential martial communications”). 
 81.  See, e.g., Development in the Law, supra note 80, at 1564 (stating that the two privileges 
often overlap); Connor, supra note 80, at 146 (discussing how the modern federal trend is to narrow 
marital privileges). 
 82.  S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7053 (1974).  
 83.  See supra note 63. 
 84.  FED. R. EVID. 505, 51 F.R.D. 315 (proposed Mar. 1971).  
 85.  See Reutlinger, supra note 79, at 1354 (stating that Congress decreed that the Rules would 
have no force). 
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immunity.86  The spousal testimony privilege allows a spouse with 
information sought for disclosure at trial to invoke the privilege to avoid 
testifying adversely to his or her spouse altogether on any subject at any 
time for the duration of the marriage.87  This “privilege is vested in the 
witness-spouse, who may neither be compelled to testify nor foreclosed 
from testifying.”88  The spousal testimony privilege “is what remains of 
the old common law rule that a spouse was incompetent as a witness for 
or against the other spouse based on the legal fiction that husband and 
wife were one person.”89  As such, allowing a wife to testify against her 
                                                          
 86.  ALA. CODE § 12-21-227 (2012); ALASKA R. EVID. 505(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4062 (2010); CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (West 
2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West Supp. 2014); D.C. CODE § 14-306 (Supp. 2014); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 24-5-503 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, R. 505 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 19-3002 (West 2006); KY. R. EVID. 504; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 505 (Supp. 2014); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 
2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (West 2002); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-505 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.295 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:84A-17(2) (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-57 (West Supp. 2013); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2945.42 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.255 (West 2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 5913 (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-17-10 (West 2006); TEX. R. EVID. 504(b); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-1-137 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West Supp. 2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1-12-104 (West 2007). 
 87.  See Roberts, supra note 54, at 1. 
 88.  United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Trammel v. United States, 
445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980)).  See also, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (1980) (modifying the Hawkins 
rule “so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may 
be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying”); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 
737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[the spousal testimony] privilege permits either spouse, upon objection, to 
exclude adverse testimony by the other”). 
 89.  Lustig, 555 F.2d at 747 (citing Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75–76 (1958); Bisno 
v. United States, 299 F.2d 711, 721 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 952 (1962)).  See also 
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 (discussing the origins of marital privilege).  In Lustig, the Ninth Circuit 
heard the appeal of defendant George Lustig from his conviction on various federal drug charges.  
555 F.2d at 742.  He challenged the refusal of the District of Alaska to recognize either the spousal 
testimony privilege or the confidential marital communications privilege to prevent his common law 
wife of seven years, Callie Newton, from testifying.  Id. at 747.  The court looked to the law of the 
State of Alaska to determine the validity of their marriage; Alaska was both the state of their shared 
residence and the state in which the privilege was asserted.  Id. at 747–48.  The Ninth Circuit 
assumed the existence of a common law marriage because the pair lived together for seven years, 
had two children, and held themselves out as husband and wife.  Id. at 747 n. 11.  Because Alaska 
did not recognize common law marriage, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the 
district court.  Id. at 748.  The Ninth Circuit declined to address whether the district court was 
compelled by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize the common 
law marriage, noting that neither privilege would apply if recognized; the spousal testimony 
privilege would not apply because the relationship ended prior to Newton’s testimony and the 
confidential marital communications privilege did not apply because “Newton’s testimony 
concerned matters neither communicative nor confidential in nature.”  Id. 
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husband was tantamount to self-incrimination.90  Fortunately, that 
explanation has evolved. 
The public policy sustaining the privilege today is the maintenance 
of marital harmony.91  It is quite obvious that forcing an unwilling 
witness to testify adversely to his or her spouse in an otherwise healthy 
marriage could irreparably damage that relationship.  The spousal 
testimony privilege prevents such forced testimony from an unwilling 
spouse, but does not prevent a willing spouse from testifying—in which 
case, “their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably 
little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.”92 
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia recognize a 
testimonial privilege for spouses.93  Of those, fifteen include language 
specific to heterosexual couples,94 while sixteen use gender neutral 
language that could be easily applied to same-sex couples if those 
jurisdictions recognized marriage equality.95  Federal common law on the 
spousal testimony privilege limits its application to criminal cases.96  
Thus, the spousal testimony privilege is more limited in its application 
than the confidential marital communications privilege. 
                                                          
 90.  See, e.g., Lustig, 555 F.2d at 747 (citing Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 75–76) (stating that the 
privilege comes from the legal fiction of husband and wife being one person); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 
43–44 (same).   
 91.  See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52 (explaining that the contemporary justification for the 
privilege is marital harmony). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See supra note 86. 
 94.  ALA. CODE § 12-21-227 (2012); ALASKA R. EVID. 505(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4062 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-503 (West 
2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3002 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 
2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-505 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.295 (West 2004); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.255 (West 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (West 2007); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 57-3-3 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-104 (West 2007). 
 95.  CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West Supp. 
2014); D.C. CODE § 14-306 (Supp. 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, R. 505 (West 2008); KY. R. 
EVID. 504; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 505 (Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 
(West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. §13-1-5 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (West 2002); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17(2) (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-57 (West Supp. 2013); OHIO R. 
EVID. 601; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-17-10 (West 
2006); TEX. R. EVID. 504(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-137 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 5.60.060(1) (West Supp. 2014). 
 96.  United States v. 281 Syosset Woodbury Rd., 71 F.3d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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The Federal Rules of Evidence are soft-spoken on all privileges, 
including marital privileges, to say the least.  When the United States 
Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972, it 
expressly included the spousal testimony privilege, among others.97  
Because the promulgated rules omitted a number of other privileges, 
including the confidential marital communications privilege and the 
physician-patient privilege, Congress balked at the proposed rules 
governing privileges.98  Questions were raised as to why the spousal 
testimony privilege was preferred over the confidential marital 
communications privilege.99  After years of Congressional Hearings and 
debate on the broader issue of privilege, Congress rejected a codification 
of specific privileges, instead favoring a broad provision placing 
discretion on the common law to continue the evolutionary development 
of testimonial privileges.100 
There is no codified federal marital privilege.  Instead, under the 
Federal Rules, a federal court applying a marital privilege must first look 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 501.  Rule 501 instructs federal courts to 
apply the privilege laws of the state supplying the rules of decision in a 
diversity case, or to apply the federal common law on privileges in a case 
in which federal substantive law applies.101  Its purpose is to “provide the 
courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case 
basis.”102 
In sum, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and federal common 
law recognize the confidential marital communications privilege,103 
while a majority of states, the District of Columbia, and federal common 
law also recognize the spousal testimony privilege.104  What these 
                                                          
 97.  Connor, supra note 80, at 136 & n.75. 
 98.  Roberts, supra note 54, at 3. 
 99.  See id. 
 100.  See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (“[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence 
acknowledge the authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of 
testimonial privileges in federal criminal trials”). 
 101.  FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 102.  Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. 
Hungate)). 
 103.  See supra note 63. 
 104.  See supra note 86. 
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privileges do not answer is whether a court should apply them to same-
sex spouses.105 
IV. MARITAL PRIVILEGES UNDER FEDERAL LAW IN THE 
ABSENCE OF DOMA § 3 
A valid marriage is key to a court’s decision to apply a marital 
privilege.106  However, states are greatly divided at the moment over 
what constitutes a valid marriage.107  On June 26, 2013, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Windsor, striking § 
3 of DOMA—which defined marriage as between a man and a woman—
as unconstitutional.108  Nonetheless, current federal law protects a state’s 
right to treat as invalid a same-sex marriage validly celebrated and 
recognized in another state.109  Many states retain statutory bans on 
same-sex marriage as well as constitutional prohibitions;110 in many 
jurisdictions, these provisions also prevent recognition by the state of 
same-sex marriages validly obtained elsewhere.111  Same-sex couples 
today straddle vastly opposite laws governing the validity of their 
marriages across state lines.  Those competing definitions of a valid 
marriage could prevent same-sex couples from exercising the full 
benefits of their marital privileges.112 
A. The History of DOMA and Mini-DOMAs 
To understand the purposes behind the federal DOMA and its state 
counterparts—as is required for any constitutional analysis concerning 
these laws—one must become familiar with the progression of same-sex 
marriage laws prior to 1996.  In the early 1970s, plaintiffs brought a few 
constitutional challenges demanding that state officials issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.113  In each case, the court ruled that a 
                                                          
 105.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 106.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 107.  See supra Part II. 
 108.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
 109.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2003).  
 110.  See infra note 123. 
 111.  See infra note 124. 
 112.  See infra Part V. 
 113.  E.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 
588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (N.Y. Special Term 1971). 
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same-sex relationship was not a marriage.114  Over two decades later, this 
jurisprudence was shaken when the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled in 
Baehr v. Lewin that the state’s prohibition on same-sex marriage violated 
the protections of the Hawaii Constitution, specifically its equal 
protection clause.115 
In response to Baehr, the United States Congress enacted DOMA 
and many states enacted similar mini-DOMAs to “defend the institution 
of traditional heterosexual marriage” from expansion to include same-sex 
partnerships.116  DOMA contains two key provisions.  In § 2, DOMA 
states that: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a 
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or 
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.117 
Section 3 provides: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.118 
Three years after DOMA was enacted, the Supreme Court of 
Vermont required the State to provide all the benefits of marriage to 
same-sex couples in Baker v. Vermont.119  In 2003, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts decided Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
striking its statutory ban on same-sex marriage as violative of its state 
constitution.120  In response to those decisions, many states amended 
their own constitutions to include same-sex marriage bans, thus ensuring 
                                                          
 114.  E.g., Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187; Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 590; Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 
501. 
 115.  852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). 
 116.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 
2, 12 (1996)). 
 117.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
 118.  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2013), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 119.  744 A.2d 864, 886–87 (Vt. 1999). 
 120.  798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
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that their mini-DOMA statutes did not run afoul of their state 
constitutions.121 
Although many states have now extended some form of legal rights 
to same-sex couples,122 forty-two states have or have had statutes or 
constitutional amendments limiting marriage to a union of a man and a 
woman.123  Twenty of those states prohibit or have prohibited legal 
                                                          
 121.  See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544–45 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (internal 
citations omitted) (“The reaction was immediate and visceral.  In the next few years, twenty-seven 
states passed anti-same-sex marriage legislation, and Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA).  In 1998, Kentucky became one of those states, enacting new statutory provisions that (1) 
defined marriage as between one man and one woman, K.R.S. § 402.005; (2) prohibited marriage 
between members of the same sex, K.R.S. § 402.020(1)(d); (3) declared same-sex marriages 
contrary to Kentucky public policy, K.R.S. § 402.040(2); and (4) declared same-sex marriages 
solemnized out of state void and the accompanying rights unenforceable, K.R.S. § 402.045.3.”). 
 122.  See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 123.  ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 
25.05.011, .013 (West 2007); ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101, 25-
112 (West 2007); ARK. CONST. amend. 83, invalidated by Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 
2014 WL 1908815 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 9, 2014) (stayed pending appeal to the Eighth Circuit); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (West 2009), invalidated by Wright, 2014 WL 1908815 (same); CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 308.5 (West 2004), invalidated by Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013), vacated 
and remanded, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (U.S. 2013) (instructing Ninth Circuit to 
“dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31, invalidated by Brinkman v. 
Long, No. 13-CV-32572, 2014 WL 3408024 (D. Colo. July 9, 2014) (stayed by the Colorado 
Supreme Court pending appeal to be heard later this year); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104 
(West Supp. 2013), invalidated by Brinkman, 2014 WL 3408024 (same); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 
101 (1999) (amended 2013); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27, invalidated by Brenner v. Scott, Nos. 
4:14cv107-RH/CAS, 4:14cv138-RH/CAS, 2014 WL 4113100 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) (stayed 
pending appeal to the Tenth Circuit); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 741.04(1), .212 (West 2010), invalidated 
by Brenner, 2014 WL 4113100 (same); GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. 1; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 
(West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (West 2003) (amended 2013), HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.6 
(West 2003) (repealed 2011); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28, invalidated by Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-cv-
00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014) (stayed pending appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-209 (West 2013), invalidated by Latta, 2014 WL 1909999 (same); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§  5/212, /213.1 (West 1999) (repealed 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-
1-1 (West 2008), invalidated by Baskin v. Bogan, Nos. 14-2386, 14-2387, 14-2388, 14-2526, 2014 
WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court); KAN. 
CONST. art. XV, § 16; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2501 (Supp. 2013); KY. CONST. § 233A, invalidated by 
Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (stayed pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.005, .020, .040, .045 (West 2006), invalidated by Love, 989 F. Supp. 2d 
536 (same); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 89, 96  (West 2013); LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 3520 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 650 (1998) (repealed 2012); MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (1999) (repealed 2012); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25, invalidated by 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (stayed pending appeal to the Sixth 
Circuit); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 551.1, .271, .272 (West 2005), invalidated by DeBoer, 973 F. 
Supp. 2d 757 (same); MINN. STAT. § 363A.27 (2004) (amended 2013), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 
(2005) (amended 2013); MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (West 2007); 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2003); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-103, -401 (2013); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; 
N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-1, -1.2 (West 2013); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 
28; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-03-01, -08 (West 2008); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11, invalidated 
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recognition of a legal same-sex marriage celebrated in another 
jurisdiction.124  Because such statutes or constitutional amendments are 
modeled after DOMA, they are referred to as mini-DOMAs.125 
                                                          
in part by Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-cv-129, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014) (stayed 
pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2011), invalidated in 
part by Henry, 2014 WL 1418395 (same); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35, invalidated by Bishop v. 
United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 
14-5003 & 14-5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014) (stayed pending petition for 
certiorari); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 3, 3.1 (West 2001), invalidated by Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
1252 (same); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a, invalidated by Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 1128 (D. 
Or. 2014); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2001), invalidated by Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 410 
(M.D. Pa. 2014); S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-10, -15 (2014); S.D. CONST. 
art. XXI, § 9; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-1-1, -38 (2013); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18, called into 
question by Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) 
(granting preliminary injunction enjoining officials from enforcing same-sex marriage ban; pending 
appeal to the Sixth Circuit); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (West 2009), called into question by 
Tanco, 2014 WL 997525 (same); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32, invalidated by De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. 
Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (stayed pending appeal to the Fifth Circuit); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2.001, 6.204 (West 2009), invalidated by De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (same); UTAH CONST. 
art. I, § 29, invalidated by Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2014) (stayed 
pending petition for certiorari); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-4.1 (West 2004), invalidated by 
Kitchen, 755 F.3d 1193 (same); VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A, invalidated by Bostic v. Schaefer, Nos. 
14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014) (stayed pending petition for 
certiorari); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2, -45.3 (West Supp. 2014), invalidated by Bostic v. Schaefer, 
Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014) (stayed pending 
petition for certiorari); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2002) (amended 2009); WASH. REV. CODE  § 
26.04.010, .020 (West Supp. 2005) (amended 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-104 (West Supp. 
2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (West 2002); WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13, invalidated by Wolf 
v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64-bbc, 2014 WL 2693963 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2014), aff’d, Baskin, 2014 
WL 4359059 (stayed pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-
1-101 (West 2014). 
 124.  ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.05.013 (West 2007); ARK. CONST. 
amend. 83, invalidated by Wright, 2014 WL 1908815 (stayed pending appeal to the Eighth Circuit); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (West 2009), invalidated by Wright, 2014 WL 1908815 (same); FLA. 
CONST. art. I § 27, invalidated by Brenner, 2014 WL 4113100 (pending appeal to the Tenth Circuit); 
GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. 4; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28, invalidated by Latta, 2014 WL 1909999 
(stayed pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233A, 
invalidated by Love, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (stayed pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit); LA. CONST. 
art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25, invalidated by DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (stayed 
pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2013); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 
29; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11, invalidated in part by Henry, 2014 WL 
1418395 (stayed pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit); S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. 
XXI, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32, invalidated by De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666 (W.D. 
Tex. 2014) (granting stay pending appeal); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29, invalidated by Kitchen, 755 
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (stayed pending petition for certiorari); VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A, 
invalidated by Bostic, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014) (stayed pending petition for 
certiorari); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (West 2002). 
 125.  See supra Part IV.A. 
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B. The Effect of United States v. Windsor on Federal Rule of Evidence 
501 
Since the Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor126 last 
year, no federal court has yet had the opportunity to consider the 
applicability of a marital privilege to a same-sex couple absent DOMA’s 
limited definition of marriage to opposite-sex spouses.  Arguably, the 
issue, although different, is no easier for a federal court post-Windsor 
than it was under the definitional confines of DOMA’s § 3. 
In Windsor, the Supreme Court ruled § 3 of DOMA 
unconstitutional.127  In that case, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer traveled 
from their joint home of many decades in New York to Canada to legally 
wed before returning to their home in New York.128  Although New York 
did not recognize same-sex marriage at the time, it did recognize the 
validity of same-sex marriages obtained legally elsewhere and afforded 
such relationships all the privileges and rights of a marriage in New 
York.129  After Spyer’s death, the IRS denied the request of Windsor, as 
executor of her estate, to exempt the estate from estate taxes because it 
passed to Spyer’s spouse.130 
Windsor sued the United States in federal court and the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York considered this 
federal question.131  Both the district court and the Second Circuit held § 
3 of DOMA unconstitutional and ordered the IRS to refund the taxes 
paid by Spyer’s estate.132  The Supreme Court affirmed, striking § 3 as 
violative of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fifth Amendment.133 
                                                          
 126.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 127.  Id. at 2696. 
 128.  Id. at 2682. 
 129.  Id. at 2683. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 2689. 
 132.  Id. at 2684.  
 133.  Id. at 2695.  Unfortunately, the Court’s decision in Windsor left open the question of 
whether heightened scrutiny is required when deciding the constitutionality of laws affecting same-
sex spouses.  See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *13 (W.D. Ky. 
Feb. 12, 2014) (“Although the majority opinion [in Windsor] covered many topics, it never clearly 
explained the applicable standard of review.”); Bishop v. United States ex. rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 
2d 1252, 1278 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006, 2014 WL 
3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014) (“The Windsor Court did not apply the familiar equal protection 
framework, which inquires as to the applicable level of scrutiny and then analyzes the law’s 
justifications.”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1193–94 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 
1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing the effect of the Supreme Court’s Windsor decision). 
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The definitional provision of DOMA—§ 3—applied to well over 
1,000 Acts of Congress and countless other administrative rulings, 
regulations, and findings.134  The Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly 
Rule 501 governing privileges, were enacted by Congress in 1975.135  
They appear after Title 28 in the United States Code and are clearly 
“Acts of Congress” subject to § 3 of DOMA.  Although neither the term 
“marriage” nor “spouse” appears in the text of Rule 501,136 DOMA 
would have had a significant role in its application prior to Windsor. 
To determine the applicability of a marital privilege in federal court 
before or after Windsor, a federal district court would first have to 
determine whether the jurisdiction recognizes the claimed privilege.  
This analysis differs depending on whether state or federal law provides 
the rule of decision in the case.137  Rule 501 explicitly directs federal 
courts sitting in diversity to apply state law to determine if a marital or 
other privilege applies.138  In a federal question case, however, federal 
courts look to federal common law to determine if a privilege applies.139 
Once a federal court has determined that a privilege exists under 
either an applicable state law or federal common law, it must determine 
that there exists or existed a valid marriage on which a marital privilege 
can rest.140  The law of marriage is reserved to the states;141 thus, “there is 
                                                          
 134.  See Letter from Danya K. Shaw, Associate General Counsel, to the U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf (citation omitted) 
(“In 1997, we issued a report identifying 1,049 federal statutory provisions classified to the United 
States Code in which benefits, rights, and privileges are contingent on marital status or in which 
marital status is a factor.”). 
 135.  An Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as FED. R. EVID., 28 U.S.C.A.)  
 136.  FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1365 (10th Cir. 1997).  In United States v. Knox, 
the Tenth Circuit concluded that the confidential marital communications privilege did not apply to 
prevent the testimony of Robyn Cartwright, the ex-wife of defendant Michael Knox.  Id.  Ms. 
Cartwright testified that she and the defendant had divorced in September 1991, prior to the October 
17, 1991 incident leading to his arrest.  Id.  The defendant provided no evidence that any 
communications relayed by Ms. Cartwright occurred prior to October 17.  Id.  After explaining that 
federal courts must look to state law to determine the existence of a marital privilege in federal court, 
however, the Tenth Circuit summarily decided that the privilege did not apply in this case, without 
citing any state law on the subject.  Id.  The choice of law issue of which state’s law to apply was 
ignored.  Id.  Federal common law recognizes both the spousal testimony privilege and the 
confidential marital communications privilege.  See Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 1, at 229–30 
(internal citations omitted) (“Common law provides for both federal spousal privileges and shows 
that the two privileges share the similar purpose of protecting marriages.”). 
 140.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 141.  Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 
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no federal law of marriage.”142  Because state rather than federal law 
governs marriages, a state law analysis of the validity of a marriage is 
required under any circumstance. 
Under DOMA § 3, before Windsor was decided, a federal court 
considering the validity of a marriage under the laws of a state that 
recognizes same-sex marriage, whether celebrated within the state or 
elsewhere, would have been faced with the additional challenge of 
determining if the definitional language of DOMA prevented the court 
from applying the state law in contravention of DOMA.  Although no 
federal court ever faced this issue, it is conceivable that it would have 
taken one of two approaches.  On one hand, a federal court could have 
determined that § 3 of DOMA prevented it from applying the state law 
definition of a valid marriage where that marriage was between members 
of the same gender.  Alternatively, a federal court considering this 
question under DOMA § 3 could have reasoned that, because the terms 
“marriage” and “spouse” are not used in the Act of Congress itself (Rule 
501), but in a state law defining a valid marriage, the court would not 
have been bound to apply the definitions of DOMA and could recognize 
a marital privilege between same-sex spouses.143 
For example, although Edith Windsor never asserted the confidential 
marital communications privilege in her federal question case,144 had she 
attempted to, the district court would have had to look to state law to 
determine if Windsor and Spyer’s marriage was valid.  Assume for the 
sake of argument that New York State law was the only option on which 
the district court could rely.  A New York court would have recognized 
the validity of the marriage obtained lawfully in Canada.145  A district 
court looking to New York law would reach the same conclusion—until 
it ran into DOMA.  Would the district court be required to apply DOMA 
                                                          
(1975)). 
 142.  Knox, 124 F.3d at 1365 (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50). 
 143.  See John Bergstresser, Note, When Evidentiary Rules Enforce Substantive Policies: Same-
Sex Marital Privilege Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in Diversity Cases, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
303, 313 (2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-644, at 31, 18 (1996)) (“Under DOMA, the question of 
whether ‘benefits available to married couples under state law will be available to homosexual 
couples is purely a matter of state law . . . [DOMA] in no way affects that question.’  Rather than 
usurping a state’s authority to determine whether to provide state marital benefits to same-sex 
couples, DOMA was intended to restrict the availability of federal marital benefits only to 
heterosexual couples.”). 
 144.  Because the marriage had ended, Windsor could not have asserted the spousal testimony 
privilege in this hypothetical.  See supra text accompanying note 87.  See also Roberts, supra note 
54, at 1. 
 145.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).  
SCHAFFZIN_FINAL_PUBLICATION.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:50 AM 
2014] BEYOND BOBBY JO CLARY 127 
§ 3 to invalidate the marriage for privilege purposes in federal court or 
would the court find DOMA inapplicable to the New York State 
definition of “marriage” or “spouse”?  No federal court ever faced that 
question during the 17-year tenure of DOMA § 3. 
Fortunately, post-Windsor, no court will ever have to answer that 
question because there no longer exists any federal definition of marriage 
in conflict with any state’s definition of marriage.  A valid marriage 
under current law will always be subject to a state law definition of 
marriage.  Determining which state’s law to apply, however, complicates 
matters tremendously. 
C. Choice of Law 
Determining which state’s law to apply to determine the validity of a 
marriage even after Windsor is a complex question, whether the federal 
court is addressing a federal question or sitting in diversity.  Not since 
the anti-miscegenation laws struck down in Loving v. Virginia146 has 
there been a greater divide among states over what constitutes a valid 
marriage.147  This opens the possibility of a federal court having to 
choose between the laws of a state that recognizes same-sex marriage 
and a state that affirmatively refuses to recognize such relationships in 
determining whether to recognize a marital privilege. 
For example, imagine the case of a same-sex couple married and 
residing in New York who, two years later, travels through Texas, which 
maintains a mini-DOMA.  While in Texas, the couple is involved in a car 
accident with a Texas citizen.  In a Texas federal court, one spouse—the 
driver—is sued for damages related to the car accident.  At trial, the 
plaintiff wishes to call the defendant’s spouse to question him about 
communications the defendant spouse made to him in confidence in New 
York after they had returned from their travels.  The defendant asserts 
the confidential marital communications privilege.  The Texas district 
court must determine whether to recognize such a privilege.  To do so, it 
must apply state law—but which one? 
Choice of law issues could arise at two points in the analysis of 
whether a marital privilege will apply.  This first area of conflict exists 
where two different states interested in the same case have conflicting 
laws as to the existence of a privilege; for example, if one state 
                                                          
 146.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 147.  See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text, 123–24 and accompanying text. 
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recognized the confidential marital communications privilege, but 
another did not.148  Professor Bergstrom explains that 
When two states are interested in a case but do not recognize the same 
privilege, generally no privilege is recognized, and the evidence is 
admissible.  Under this approach, evidence tends to be admitted 
because one state’s recognition of a privilege, even if that state’s 
substantive laws apply to the case, is not sufficient to exclude the 
evidence.149 
In the hypothetical situation above, this conflict will not arise if both 
states recognize the confidential marital communications privilege. 
The second choice of law issue arises when determining if a party or 
witness is a spouse “if the putative spouse married in another jurisdiction 
and the marriage is not recognized in the state in which the case is heard.  
The court must determine which laws govern the validity of the marriage 
and whether the marriage is valid.”150  As to this issue, a conflict between 
state laws over whether a valid marriage exists may arise even after the 
question of whether a privilege could exist is answered.  “[A] party’s 
home-state laws determine whether the party is a spouse.  A forum state 
may recognize a marriage contracted in another jurisdiction even if it 
could not have been contracted in the forum state.  Conversely, the forum 
state’s laws may proscribe such recognition.”151  Because DOMA § 2 
                                                          
 148.  See Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 1, at 237. 
 149.  Id. at 238 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139 & cmt. d 
(1971)).  Courts recognize an exception to this general rule where the state with the most significant 
relationship with the communication recognizes a marital privilege that the forum state does not and 
the party asserting the privilege demonstrates a “special reason why the forum policy favoring 
admission should not be given effect.”  Id. at 238–39 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139(2).  A trial court should weigh four factors to determine if “special 
reasons” exist: “(1) the number and nature of the contacts that the state of the forum has with the 
parties and with the transaction involved, (2) the relative materiality of the evidence that is sought to 
be excluded, (3) the kind of privilege involved and (4) fairness to the parties.”  Id. at 239 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139(2) cmt. d.  Courts recognize an additional 
exception to the general rule admitting evidence in light of a conflict of laws concerning the 
recognition of a marital privilege: “when admitting the evidence would be ‘contrary to the strong 
public policy of the forum.’”  Id. at 239 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 
139(1).  Given the strong debate on this issue, one can imagine that a state wishing to recognize a 
valid same-sex marriage would argue that a strong public policy against discrimination would trigger 
such an exception.  Likewise, a state refusing to recognize same-sex marriage would argue that 
strong public policies behind encouraging committed opposite-sex marriages, maintaining the 
traditional definition of marriage, and promoting procreation within the confines of marriage would 
also trigger the exception.  In either case, the situation remains that a privilege recognized in one 
state may not be recognized in another state. 
 150.  Id. at 237–38. 
 151.  Id. at 240 (internal citations omitted). 
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provides that states need not recognize a valid marriage celebrated 
elsewhere, states are not bound to honor the marriages performed by 
other states under current law.152  With so many states divided over the 
issue of marriage equality, the risk of these definitions conflicting is on 
the rise. 
V. A LESSER PRIVILEGE? 
As explained above, a state with a mini-DOMA need not recognize a 
same-sex marriage celebrated in another state as valid because § 2 of 
DOMA federally protects states in curtailing those rights. 153  Without a 
valid marriage, the courts in those states with mini-DOMAs will not 
recognize either marital privilege in their courts when asserted by a 
same-sex spouse.154  This reality may have a chilling effect on same-sex 
spouses in how they communicate even while present in the state which 
celebrated their marriage.  Because “an uncertain privilege . . . is little 
better than no privilege at all,”155 the mini-DOMAs in effect in states 
other than that in which the same-sex spouses were married essentially 
prevent those spouses from exercising the rights and privileges afforded 
them by the state recognizing their marriage.  For example, Texas’s 
mini-DOMA may prevent a same-sex couple legally married and 
residing in New York from communicating freely within New York 
despite the fact that New York intended to afford same-sex couples all 
the rights and privileges of marriage, including marital privileges.156  In 
that light, it seems that voters in Texas have devalued the rights of New 
York citizens, creating an inequality unintended by New York law. 
A. Section 2 of DOMA and Mini-DOMAs 
While the Supreme Court struck § 3 of DOMA in United States v. 
Windsor,157 that decision had no effect on § 2, which remains a valid 
statute.  In § 2, DOMA states: 
                                                          
 152.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 155.  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
 156.  See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2013) (providing that same-sex couples 
should have the same access as others to the protections, responsibilities, rights, obligations, and 
benefits of civil marriage).   
 157.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013). 
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No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a 
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or 
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.158 
Thus, federal law currently protects state laws modeled after § 3 of 
DOMA, although the Supreme Court has already ruled § 3 itself 
unconstitutional.159 
Currently, mini-DOMAs are under attack in the courts,160 and several 
more have already been ruled unconstitutional by federal district 
courts,161 as well as a state supreme court.162  The reasoning of the 
district courts in each case, resolved post-Windsor, relied on the Supreme 
Court’s analysis that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, as well as in some cases the Due Process 
Clause, of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.163  Until either 
Congress repeals or the Supreme Court strikes § 2 of DOMA, or every 
mini-DOMA is repealed or individually ruled unconstitutional, the 
situation will remain that a court considering the applicability of marital 
privileges will have to discern whether a marriage valid in one state is 
valid in another.164 
Under a traditional conflict of laws analysis, states should recognize 
marriages validly celebrated in another state, unless the marriage is an 
evasive one (one in which the couple leaves their home state to 
                                                          
 158.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
 159.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96 (holding § 3 of DOMA unconstitutional, but leaving § 
2 in force). 
 160.  See, e.g., Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 997525, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 
14, 2014) (granting preliminary injunction preventing State of Tennessee from denying validity of 
three same-sex marriages validly celebrated out-of-state). 
 161.  See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, Bostic v. 
Shaefer, Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 
No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014); Bishop v. Unites States ex. 
rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003 & 
14-5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 
1188 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 162.  See, e.g., Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013) (striking New Mexico’s mini-
DOMA as violative of the state constitution). 
 163.  See, e.g., Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 480, 482 (finding violations of Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses); Bourke, 2014 WL 556729, at *3 (finding equal protection violation); Bishop, 
962 F. Supp. 2d at 1258 (finding equal protection violation); Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1205, 1215 
(finding due process and equal protection violations). 
 164.  See supra Part IV.C. 
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temporarily travel to another state to marry because their home state 
would not otherwise celebrate or recognize their marriage).165  The 
purpose of this “place of celebration rule” is to provide to the couple 
predictability about their rights and obligations within the marriage.166  
Mini-DOMAs, however, invoke the “public policy exception” to this 
place of celebration rule to abandon comity, upending validly celebrated 
marriages in contravention of the public policy to sustain marriages.167 
B. An Uncertain Privilege 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor took issue with the 
fact that § 3 of DOMA sought “to injure the very class New York 
[sought] to protect.”168  The Court noted that, “[a]fter a statewide 
deliberative process that enabled its citizens to discuss and weigh 
arguments for and against same-sex marriage, New York acted to enlarge 
the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected 
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier 
known or understood.”169  The Court viewed the actions of the Federal 
Government in enacting § 3 of DOMA as imposing “restrictions and 
disabilities” on a class of New York citizens “resulting [in] injury and 
indignity.”170  The Court deemed these actions by the United States to be 
overstepping the bounds of federalism in violation of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.171 
Mini-DOMAs, in effect, do the same thing in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that § 3 of DOMA did in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.172  These laws curtail the rights and privileges of same-sex 
                                                          
 165.  Sanders, supra note 2, at 100. 
 166.  Id. at 100–01. 
 167.  Id. at 101. 
 168.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).  “When New York adopted a law 
to permit same-sex marriage, it sought to eliminate inequality; but DOMA frustrates that objective 
through a system-wide enactment with no identified connection to any particular area of federal 
law.”  Id. at 2694. 
 169.  Id. at 2689 (citing Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749 (McKinney) (codified 
at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10–a, 10–b, 13 (McKinney 2013)). 
 170.  Id. at 2692. 
 171.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. 
 172.  The two situations are, however, distinguishable in that states are vested with the power to 
define marriage.  See id. at 2692 (2013) (noting states’ power to define marriage and the significance 
of that power).  In the example here, we have one state’s expansion of marriage abridged by another 
state’s limitation on marriage.  This is arguably different from the situation of the federal 
government overreaching into the law of marriage to create a body of law at odds with the expansive 
definition of marriage one state, fully entitled to define marriage, has adopted. 
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spouses lawfully bestowed upon them by a state that intended such rights 
and privileges to be realized.  Returning to the example above, Texas’s 
mini-DOMA limits the exercise of a privilege in New York by New 
Yorkers, despite the fact that New York intended the New York couple 
to have unlimited access to the benefits which accompany the marital 
privileges.  The New Yorkers cannot fully embrace “the best solace of 
human existence”173—the intimate exchange of communications with a 
spouse—in New York, for fear that the privilege will not be recognized 
in any state with a mini-DOMA.174  This is because the New York couple 
cannot foresee whether either or both spouses will ever be involved in 
criminal or civil litigation in any one of those states.  Without knowing 
the communications will be protected, the policy behind the privilege is 
defeated; “[a]n uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at 
all.”175 
Evidentiary privileges are useless absent certainty and predictability 
in their application.176  “If there is no certainty of application, the 
                                                          
 173.  Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839). 
 174.  A valid argument is made by at least one commentator that the non-existence of a marital 
communications privilege would have no chilling effect on communications between spouses.  See 
Teachers’ Manual to Green, Nesson & Murray, Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence, 3rd 
Edition: The Husband and Wife Privilege, HARVARD LAW, http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
publications/evidenceiii/professorspages/tmch7e.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (“A marital 
communications privilege does not materially foster marital communications because many spouses 
are unaware of its existence and few spouses would hesitate to communicate because of its absence. 
Any damage to a marriage relationship caused by one spouse testifying against the other would seem 
to flow from one doing damage to the other, not from one disclosing communications of the 
other.”)  This is a logical argument.  If courts or legislators, however, believed it to be true, there 
would be no need for a marital communications privilege in any case.  The need for such a privilege, 
or lack thereof, is beyond the scope of this article.  Logical arguments to the contrary aside, I will 
proceed from the assumption that there exists some positive effect of the marital communications 
privilege in encouraging intra-marital communications sufficient to justify recognition of such a 
privilege in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
 175.  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
 176.  See, e.g., id. at 393 (“An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results 
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”); Grace M. 
Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not Protect Communications in 
the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 551 (2012) (discussing how uncertainty in a 
privilege undermines the purposes of a privilege and renders it ineffective); id. at 551 n. 341 
(quoting Daniel J. Capra, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Common Representations, TRIAL LAW. 
Q., Summer 1989, at 20, 21) (“noting that confusion is costly because ‘it is crucial for the attorney 
and client to know at the outset whether proposed communications are within the privilege’”); 
Katharine T. Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work 
and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 65 (2005) (noting that significant 
uncertainty in the application of a privilege discourages parties from communicating pursuant to the 
privilege).  See also Gregory J. Kopta, Comment, Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work 
Product Privileges to Allied Party Exchange of Information in California, 36 UCLA L. REV. 151, 
153 (1988) (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. 
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privilege has no value because no one can know that a communication is 
privileged when that communication occurs.”177  If an individual doubts 
that a confidence will be maintained and protected by a court, then he or 
she is significantly less like to share communications of consequence.178  
Because the purpose of the confidential marital communications 
privilege is to encourage spouses to seek out the comforts of their 
partners concerning the most significant subjects in their lives,179 
uncertainty in the maintenance of such confidences would serve to 
frustrate that goal. 
VI. OPTIONS FOR RESTORING CERTAINTY TO MARITAL 
PRIVILEGES 
As explained above, the only way to ensure that same-sex married 
citizens may fully enjoy the rights and benefits of marriage within states 
where their marriages are recognized—including the intimate sharing of 
confidential communications between spouses—is to ensure that their 
marriage would be deemed valid by all other states—even those with 
mini-DOMAs.180  Until those individuals can predict that their marriages 
will be recognized as valid in all fifty states, they should assume that no 
marital privilege will apply to them in a state with a mini-DOMA, even 
to protect communications made and marriages celebrated out-of-state.181  
Without uniform marital privileges, the relationships and 
communications the recognizing state intended to promote and maintain 
will instead be inhibited by the laws of other jurisdictions.182 
To effectuate the intent of those jurisdictions which do extend 
marital privileges to same-sex spouses, one of two options is needed.  
                                                          
REV. 1605, 1609–17 (1986)) (“Continuing uncertainty exacts a high price.  Fear of waiver in general 
is very expensive to both the participants and the legal system itself.”). 
 177.  Giesel, supra note 176, at 551 (citations omitted). 
 178.  See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391–93 (stating that uncertainty of privilege applicability will have 
the effect of decreasing communication between persons who are unsure of whether their 
communications will be privileged). 
 179.  See Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839) (“This rule is founded upon the deepest and 
soundest principles of our nature.  Principles which have grown out of those domestic relations, that 
constitute the basis of civil society; and which are essential to the enjoyment of that confidence 
which should subsist between those who are connected by the nearest and dearest relations of life. 
To break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife, would 
be to destroy the best solace of human existence.”). 
 180.  See supra Part V.B. 
 181.  See supra Part V.B. 
 182.  See supra Part V.B. 
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First, a uniform marital privilege would provide the predictability needed 
to enable same-sex couples fostering a family relationship and 
communications in a state that recognizes their full marital rights to 
maintain that relationship and strengthen those communications.  
Second, a ruling from the Supreme Court of the United States that both 
DOMA and mini-DOMAs are unconstitutional would require states not 
currently recognizing valid same-sex marriages to do so; in a court’s 
analysis of whether to apply a marital privilege, the conclusion that a 
valid marriage exists will lead the court to recognize the privilege where 
it is otherwise available. 
A. A Uniform Privilege? 
The first option—a uniform marital privilege—is not a viable 
solution.  Of course, the Supreme Court could promulgate a Federal Rule 
of Evidence concerning marital privileges.  Unfortunately, they tried that 
in 1972 and Congress then spent three years debating the federal law on 
privileges before scrapping all rules on privilege in favor of allowing 
federal common law to govern privileges where federal law provides the 
rules of decision, and requiring federal courts to apply state law on 
privileges where state law otherwise applies to the case.183  Interestingly, 
the privilege the Court advanced in 1972 was the spousal immunity 
privilege; the Court intentionally omitted the confidential marital 
communications privilege.184  Today, not only would our modern 
Congress have to agree on the extent of the marital privileges covered 
under a federal rule, they would have to agree to extend it to same-sex 
couples.  Given the divided state of our Congress, it seems highly 
unlikely that such a scenario could ever play out in the near future. 
Besides, a federal rule on privileges would apply only in federal 
court; to achieve the uniformity needed concerning the recognition of 
marital privileges to same-sex couples, federal and state courts would all 
have to adopt a similar privilege extending marital privileges to same-sex 
couples.  In this current political landscape of states characterized as red 
or blue, achieving unanimity on the issue of extending marital privileges 
to same-sex spouses is unrealistic.  The fact that forty-two states have 
passed legislation or constitutional amendments to prevent recognition of 
                                                          
 183.  See Eileen A. Scallen, Proceeding with Caution: Making & Amending the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 601, 608–09 (2008) (examining the history of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and noting the controversy over the rules concerning privilege). 
 184.  See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
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same-sex marriages,185 further renders a uniform marital privilege 
impossible. 
B. Court Intervention 
That leaves the second option for allowing same-sex partners to fully 
exercise the benefits associated with marital privileges—intervention by 
the Supreme Court—as the only viable option for achieving the 
predictability necessary to resolve the current inequitable application of 
marital privileges.  The Court could rely on any one of a number of 
arguments to strike both DOMA and mini-DOMAs, including the Equal 
Protection Clause,186 the Due Process Clause,187 or the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.188  Uniformity in the application of marital privileges is 
not achieved directly, but uniformity in determining the validity of a 
marriage is, nonetheless, achieved under this option.  The privileges 
could remain as they were under DOMA and mini-DOMAs; the 
difference would be whether the court finds a valid marriage.  In so 
finding a valid marriage even in the case of a same-sex couple, the 
privilege would be applied.  With that predictability, same-sex partners 
could then fully exercise the rights and benefits conferred to them by the 
states celebrating their marriages; they would be free to communicate 
intimately just like any opposite-sex couple without fear of those 
communications later being exposed. 
1. Equal Protection Under the Law 
The most successful argument challenging same-sex marriage bans 
post-United States v. Windsor is that such prohibitions violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.189  That clause 
prohibits any state from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the 
                                                          
 185.  See supra note 123. 
 186.  See infra Part VI.B.1. 
 187.  See infra Part VI.B.2. 
 188.  See infra Part VI.3. 
 189.  See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, Bostic v. 
Schaefer, Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. Jul. 28, 2014) (finding that 
Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 
3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) (finding that Kentucky’s same-
sex marriage ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1258 (holding 
that Oklahoma’s same-sex marriage ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Kitchen v. Herbert, 
961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1188 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding that 
Utah’s same-sex marriage ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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equal protection of [its] laws.”190  Where a state law interferes with the 
exercise of a fundamental right, that law must be closely tailored to 
effectuate sufficiently important state interests.191  Where a fundamental 
right is not affected, but a class-based equal protection challenge is 
raised, the court must first ask, “whether the challenged state action 
intentionally discriminates between groups of persons.”192  Where a 
finding of intentional discrimination is made, a court must then decide 
whether the state’s discriminatory action is justified by some “upright 
government purpose.”193 
Heightened scrutiny of intentional discrimination is warranted where 
the target of the discrimination is a suspect class.194  Legislation that 
targets classifications based on sex or illegitimacy is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, which upholds quasi-suspect classifications only 
where they are “substantially related to an important governmental 
objective.”195  All other discriminatory laws are subject to the rational 
basis test.196 
While several courts have insinuated that a heightened level of 
scrutiny should apply to the issue of same-sex marriage, there is no 
consensus on that issue currently.197  Many recent decisions on the matter 
have, nonetheless, found that same-sex marriage bans do not even satisfy 
the rational basis test requiring that the state law bear “a rational 
                                                          
 190.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 191.  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). 
 192.  SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil, 666 F.3d 678, 685 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. V. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272–74 (1999); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). 
 193.  Id. at 686. 
 194.  See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discussing equal protection scrutiny 
levels); SECSYS, 666 F.3d at 687 (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272–73) (discussing intentional 
discrimination and equal protection classifications). 
 195.  Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. 
 196.  See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (explaining the need for a rationally 
related governmental interest); SECSYS, 666 F.3d at 687 (discussing whether discrimination existed 
for rational reasons).  
 197.  See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 473 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, Bostic v. 
Shaefer, Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014) (finding strict 
scrutiny should apply because Virginia’s laws infringe on a fundamental right and are aimed at a 
discrete and insular minority); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *4–5 
(W.D. Ky. July 1, 2014) (stating that “a number of reasons suggest that gay and lesbian individuals 
do constitute a suspect class,” before ultimately applying rational basis review because the Windsor 
Court “did not clearly state that the non-recognition of marriages under Section 3 of DOMA 
implicated a fundamental right”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1204 (D. Utah 2013), 
aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The court therefore finds that the Plaintiffs have a 
fundamental right to marry that protects their choice of a same-sex partner.”). 
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relationship to some legitimate end.”198  As explained above, the 
Supreme Court in Windsor found that the federal definition of marriage 
found in DOMA § 3 failed the rational basis test.199  Since Windsor was 
decided, several federal courts have also found state mini-DOMAs 
failing the rational basis test.200 
In Bostic v. Rainey, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia held that Virginia’s statutory mini-DOMA and 
constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage deprived same-
gender Virginia couples of the fundamental right to marry in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because 
those laws were not sufficiently tailored to effectuate only those 
important state interests.201  Moreover, the court held that such laws 
violate the Equal Protection Clause even absent a finding that the right to 
marry is a fundamental right because same-sex couples are treated 
differently under Virginia’s laws than opposite-sex couples, although 
they are similarly situated.202  Although the court held that strict scrutiny 
                                                          
 198.  See, e.g., Bostic,  970 F. Supp. 2d at 482; Bourke,  2014 WL 556729, at *7 (citing Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 538 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2005); Nev. Dep’t of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733–35 (2003)) (“Over the past forty years, the Supreme Court 
has refused to allow mere tradition to justify marriage statutes that violate individual liberties.”); 
Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1290–95 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, 
Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014) (“the Court 
concludes that exclusion of same-sex couples is ‘so attenuated’ from any of [the state’s proffered] 
goals that the exclusion cannot survive rational-basis review”); Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1206–07 
(citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (2005)) (“[B]ecause the court finds that 
Amendment 3 fails rational basis review, it need not analyze why Utah is also unable to satisfy the 
more rigorous standard of demonstrating an ‘exceedingly persuasive’ justification for its prohibition 
against same-sex marriage.”).  
 199.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 200.  Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 482; Bourke, 2014 WL 556729, at *7; Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 
1290–95; Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1206–07.  Notably, the New Mexico Supreme Court has ruled 
since Windsor that New Mexico’s mini-DOMA discriminated against a discrete subclass and failed 
to pass muster under intermediate scrutiny.  Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013) 
(striking New Mexico’s prohibitions on same-sex marriage as violative of the state Constitution).  
 201.  970 F. Supp. 2d at 482.  The court in Bostic ultimately held Virginia’s statutory and 
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 484.  In that case, Plaintiffs Timothy Bostic 
and Tony London were denied a marriage license by the Clerk for the Circuit Court for the City of 
Norfolk.  Id. at 462.  They met all the legal requirements for marriage in Virginia, except neither of 
the applicants was a woman.  Id.  Plaintiffs Carol Schall and Mary Townley joined the suit 
challenging the facets of Virginia’s marriage laws which refused to recognize the couple’s lawful 
marriage in California, denying them many of the benefits received by opposite-sex married couples 
in Virginia.  Id. at 462–63.  Schall and Townley met all legal requirements for recognition of their 
marriage in Virginia, with the exception that neither is a man.  Id. at 462. 
 202.  Id. at 480. 
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applied, it decided that Virginia’s same-sex marriage prohibitions fail to 
pass muster even under the most deferential rational basis test.203 
In Bourke v. Beshear, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Kentucky held Kentucky’s statutory and 
constitutional bans on the recognition of valid same-sex marriages 
celebrated in foreign states to be unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.204  Although the court 
reasoned (1) that the Supreme Court indicated that heightened review 
may apply, (2) that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals may also apply a 
heightened standard of review if asked to revisit the issue, and (3) that it 
strongly believed sexual orientation could be deemed a suspect class 
warranting heightened review, it ultimately applied only the rational 
basis test.205  Ultimately, the court determined that the proffered purpose 
for Kentucky’s same-sex marriage bans—to preserve the state’s 
institution of traditional marriage—was not a sufficiently legitimate 
interest to pass constitutional muster under the rational basis test.206 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Oklahoma similarly held Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, Jr.207  
                                                          
 203.  Id. at 482.  “The legitimate purposes proffered by the Proponents for the challenged laws—
to promote conformity to the traditions and heritage of a majority of Virginia’s citizens, to 
perpetuate a generally-recognized deference to the state’s will pertaining to domestic relations laws, 
and, finally, to endorse ‘responsible reproduction’—share no rational link with Virginia Marriage 
Laws being challenged.  The goal and the result of this legislation is to deprive Virginia’s gay and 
lesbian citizens of the opportunity and right to choose to celebrate, in marriage, a loving, rewarding, 
monogamous relationship with a partner to whom they are committed for life.  These results occur 
without furthering any legitimate state purpose.”  Id.  
 204.  2014 WL 556729, at *1.  Beshear involved claims brought by homosexual Kentucky 
citizens, validly married outside Kentucky, and their children, challenging the constitutionality of 
Kentucky’s mini-DOMA.  Id. at *2. 
 205.  Id. at *4–5.  “So, we are left without a clear answer . . . .  Therefore, the Court will apply 
rational basis review.  Ultimately, the result in this case is unaffected by the level of scrutiny 
applied.”  Id.  
 206.  Id. at *7 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 538 U.S. 
558, 577–78 (2005); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733–35 (2003)) (“Over the 
past forty years, the Supreme Court has refused to allow mere tradition to justify marriage statutes 
that violate individual liberties.”). 
 207.  962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-
5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014).  In Bishop, Susan Barton and Gay Phillips, 
lesbian Oklahoma residents legally married in both Canada and California, sued Sally Howe Smith, 
Court Clerk for Tulsa Oklahoma, alleging among other things that Oklahoma’s mini-DOMA 
violated their substantive due process rights and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 1262.  Mary Bishop and Sharon Baldwin, also lesbian Oklahoma residents, 
alleged similar claims after their application for a marriage license was denied.  Id. at 1263.  After 
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The court described the intentional discrimination in Oklahoma’s mini-
DOMA to be “stark,” noting that “[i]ts effect is to prevent every same-
sex couple in Oklahoma from receiving a marriage license, and no other 
couple.”208  The court found further evidence of intentional 
discrimination in the public comments of Oklahoma legislators at the 
time of the laws passage.209  After determining that class-based 
discrimination against same-sex couples was not entitled to heightened 
scrutiny,210 the court found that none of the justifications for Oklahoma’s 
mini-DOMA—to promote morality, to encourage responsible 
procreation, to steer procreative relationships to marriage, to promote the 
traditional nuclear family, and to maintain the traditional definition of 
marriage—satisfied the rational basis test.211 
In Kitchen v. Herbert, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah 
held Utah’s mini-DOMA violative of both the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.212  The court determined 
that the right to marry was a fundamental right requiring strict 
scrutiny.213  It further found strict scrutiny implicated because Utah’s 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage involved a sex-based classification.214  
Nonetheless, the court ultimately decided the matter by finding that 
Utah’s bans on same-sex marriage failed even the rational basis test.215 
                                                          
determining that the Barton couple lacked standing to sue the clerk, the court noted that, but for their 
sexual orientation, the Bishop couple met all the legal requirements for a marriage license in 
Oklahoma.  Id. at 1274–75. 
 208.  Id. at 1282.  “[T]his is a classic, class-based equal protection case in which a line was 
purposefully drawn between two groups of Oklahoma citizens—same-sex couples desiring an 
Oklahoma marriage license and opposite-sex couples desiring an Oklahoma marriage license.”  Id. at 
1285. 
 209.  Id. at 1282–83. 
 210.  Id. at 1287. 
 211.  Id. at 1290–95 (“the Court concludes that exclusion of same-sex couples is ‘so attenuated’ 
from any of [the state’s proffered] goals that the exclusion cannot survive rational-basis review”). 
 212.  961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1205, 1215 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).  
In Kitchen, two same-sex couples wishing to marry were denied a marriage license, and a third 
couple was denied recognition of their marriage validly celebrated in Iowa.  Id. at 1188–90.  They 
challenged the constitutionality of Utah’s mini-DOMA and similar statutes under both the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 1187. 
 213.  Id. at 1200. 
 214. Id. at 1206 (“Applying the same logic [of Loving v. Virginia], the court finds that the fact of 
equal application to both men and women does not immunize Utah’s Amendment 3 from the 
heightened burden of justification that the Fourteenth Amendment requires of state laws drawn 
according to sex.”). 
 215.  Id. at 1211, 1214 (finding that the “[s]tate’s interest in responsible procreation and optimal 
child-rearing” are not furthered by “prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying”). 
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Applying the Equal Protection arguments accepted by several federal 
courts considering the constitutionality of DOMA and mini-DOMAs 
post-Windsor to the specific example of same-sex marital privileges 
leads to the conclusion that those laws allowing states to refuse to 
recognize valid same-sex marriages celebrated in other states are 
similarly unconstitutional. 
While the right to marry is a fundamental right,216 and at least a few 
courts have held the right to marry a person of the same-sex is also a 
fundamental right,217 there is little support for an argument that the 
recognition of a marital privilege is a fundamental right.  A marital 
privilege is just that, a privilege.  Thus, one would be hard-pressed to 
make the argument that heightened scrutiny should apply where a state 
refuses to apply an otherwise available marital privilege to a same-sex 
couple because the couple was being denied a fundamental right. 
Arguably, however, heightened scrutiny could apply where a state 
refuses to extend a marital privilege to a same-sex couple on the basis of 
animus.  A few courts considering a similar issue post-Windsor have 
found that the purpose of DOMA and mini-DOMAs was to intentionally 
discriminate against a discrete minority.218  The purpose behind refusing 
to recognize a marital privilege available to similarly situated opposite-
sex couples also demonstrates animus.  Such animus triggers heightened 
scrutiny, requiring the proponent of the law to show that the law is 
narrowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental objective.219 
In the case of marital privileges, DOMA and mini-DOMAs fail to 
survive heightened scrutiny on both fronts.  First, many federal courts 
considering prohibitions on same-sex marriage post-Windsor have found 
no significant governmental objective related to denying the validity of 
same-sex marriages.220  Second, the law is certainly not narrowly tailored 
to achieve any of those objectives argued in support of mini-DOMAs.  
                                                          
 216.  See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J. ex rel. S.L.J. & L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 
(1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1978). 
 217.  E.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, Bostic v. Shaefer, 
Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. 2014); Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 
1204.  
 218.  E.g., Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 482; Bishop v. Unites States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
1252, at 1282–85 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003, 14-5006, 2014 WL 
3537847 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 219.  See, e.g., Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 473 (stating that regulations impacting fundamental 
rights must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”). 
 220.  See Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 482; Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1296; Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 
2d at 1215. 
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For example, the laws ban recognition of all same-sex marriages; a law 
narrowly tailored to protect the interests in procreation (a discredited 
objective) would prohibit same-sex couples from legally adopting 
children, rather than prevent couples from sharing their lives together.  
These laws fail under heightened scrutiny. 
Nonetheless, many courts considering the validity of mini-DOMAs 
post-Windsor have applied the rational basis test finding that, even under 
this test that is most deferential to state law, mini-DOMAs frustrate the 
Equal Protection Clause.221  When considering a court’s refusal to apply 
a marital privilege to a same-sex couple validly married in another state, 
such actions also fail the rational basis test.  As noted by so many courts 
post-Windsor, there is no legitimate purpose for denying the right to 
marry to same-sex partners;222 similarly, there is no legitimate purpose 
for denying marital privileges to validly married same-sex partners when 
such privileges are available to their opposite-sex counterparts.  And, as 
explained by those courts, there exists no rational relationship between 
prohibiting same-sex marriage and encouraging procreation, encouraging 
marriage, or any of the other objectives advanced by defenders of mini-
DOMAs.223  Similarly, there is no rational relationship between denying 
the marital privileges to same-sex spouses and any of those objectives 
advanced.  For these reasons, the denial of marital privileges to same-sex 
spouses violates their equal protection rights. 
2. Substantive Due Process 
Some courts considering the constitutionality of mini-DOMAs post-
Windsor have found such laws to also violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.224  The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides: 
                                                          
 221.  See, e.g., Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 478; Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp .2d 542, 544 
(W.D. Ky. 2014); Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1295; Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1205. 
 222.  See supra note 221. 
 223.  See, e.g., Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (“Virginia’s Marriage Laws fail to display a 
rational relationship to a legitimate purpose, and so must be viewed as constitutionally infirm under 
even the least onerous level of scrutiny.”); Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (“the Court cannot 
conceive of any reasons for enacting the laws challenged here.”); Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1295 
(“Having considered all four proffered justifications for Part A, the Court concludes that exclusion 
of same-sex couples is ‘so attenuated’ from any of these goals that the exclusion cannot survive 
rational-basis review.”); Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (“the State of Utah has not demonstrated a 
rational, much less a compelling, reason why the Plaintiffs should be denied their right to marry.”). 
 224.  E.g., Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 484; Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1205. 
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No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.225 
It applies not only to procedural matters but to those involving 
substantive law, as well.226  “Thus all fundamental rights comprised 
within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from 
invasion by the States.”227 
In determining whether a state law violates the substantive due 
process rights of a U.S. citizen, a court must first determine if the 
plaintiff seeks protection of a fundamental right and, next, whether the 
state law improperly compromises that fundamental right.228  “There can 
be no serious doubt that in America the right to marry is a rigorously 
protected fundamental right.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
repeatedly that marriage is a fundamental right protected by both the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”229 
In Bostic v. Rainey, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia held that Virginia’s statutory mini-DOMA and 
constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage deprived 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Virginia citizens of the 
fundamental right to marry in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.230  In Kitchen v. Herbert, the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah similarly found Utah’s mini-
DOMA violated the fundamental right to marry in violation of the Due 
                                                          
 225.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 226.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1992) (quoting 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (“[I]t is settled that the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to 
matters of procedure.”). 
 227.  Id. at 847 (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring)).  
 228.  Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 470. 
 229.  Id. at 470–71 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J. ex rel. S.L.J. & L.J, 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Casey, 
505 U.S. at 848; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–
84 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); United States v. Kras, 409 
U.S. 434, 446 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Andrews v. 
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 30 (1903); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888), abrogated on other 
grounds, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948)). 
 230.  See Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (holding Virginia’s statutory and constitutional bans on 
same-sex marriage unconstitutional under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). 
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Process Clause.231  The court in Kitchen noted that the right to a same-
sex marriage was not a new right compared to the right to opposite-sex 
marriage, just as the United States Supreme Court did not distinguish the 
right to an interracial marriage from the right to an intraracial marriage in 
Loving v. Virginia.232 
Finally, a court that has determined that a state law infringes on a 
fundamental right must apply strict scrutiny to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the state law.233  Strict scrutiny requires that such 
state laws be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.234  In 
Bostic v. Rainey, the Eastern District of Virginia held that preserving the 
tradition of opposite sex marriage fails a strict scrutiny or even rational 
basis analysis.235  That court also held that the justifications for the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage relating to federalism236 and optimal 
child rearing similarly failed to pass muster under either strict scrutiny or 
rational basis analysis.237  In Kitchen v. Herbert, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Utah found that the purposes behind Utah’s same-sex 
                                                          
 231.  See Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1211 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 
(10th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he court finds that the legitimate government interests that Utah cites are not 
rationally related to Utah’s prohibition of same-sex marriage.”). 
 232.  Id. at 1202 (“Instead of declaring a new right to interracial marriage [in Loving v. Virginia], 
the Court held that individuals could not be restricted from exercising their existing right to marry on 
account of the race of their chosen partner.  [Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).]  Similarly, 
the Plaintiffs here do not seek a new right to same-sex marriage, but instead ask the court to hold that 
the State cannot prohibit them from exercising their existing right to marry on account of the sex of 
their chosen partner.”). 
 233.  See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)) (“the Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the 
government to infringe . . . fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’”); Kitchen, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1210 (stating that a burden on a fundamental right requires the standard of strict 
scrutiny).  
 234.  See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. 
 235.  970 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (“This proffer lacks any rational basis.  Virginia’s purported interest 
in minimizing marriage fraud is in no way furthered by excluding one segment of the 
Commonwealth’s population from the right to marry based upon that segment’s sexual 
orientation.”).  “[T]radition alone cannot justify denying same-sex couples the right to marry any 
more than it could justify Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage.”  Id. at 475. 
 236.  Id. at 475–77 (same-sex marriage ban proponents asserted “that Virginia maintains a 
significant interest in reserving the power to regulate essential state matters, and to shield the 
exercise of that power from intrusive, improper federal interference,” but the court stated that such 
state powers are limited by the Constitution).  “[F]ederal courts have intervened, properly, when 
state regulations have infringed upon the right to marry.”  Id. at 476. 
 237.  Id. at 478.  (“Of course the welfare of our children is a legitimate state interest.  However, 
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails to further this interest.  Instead, needlessly 
stigmatizing and humiliating children who are being raised by the loving couples targeted by 
Virginia’s Marriage Laws betrays that interest.”). 
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marriage bans fail not only strict scrutiny, but the rational basis test as 
well.238 
Defining the issue broadly, the denial of a marital privilege to a 
same-sex couple, although such a privilege would be available to a 
similarly situated opposite-sex couple, involves the denial of the 
fundamental right to marry.  This would trigger strict scrutiny.239  
However, narrowly defined, the issue involves the denial of a privilege—
a marital privilege—not a fundamental right.  From this perspective, a 
court would have a more difficult time finding the violation of a 
fundamental right where a marital privilege is denied.  Thus, the denial 
of marital privileges does not strongly support a finding that mini-
DOMAs violate the Due Process Clause. 
3. Comity 
Interestingly, neither the Supreme Court nor any federal Circuit 
Court has ever weighed into the debate of whether marriage laws are 
subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.240  The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State.”241  The Supreme Court interpreted that clause in Magnolia 
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, explaining that without the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, the states would be “foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore 
rights and obligations” of the others;242 under the clause, it seems, states 
are required to respect the rights and obligations created under the laws 
of the others.  At least one commentator has suggested “the applicability 
of full faith and credit to the interstate recognition of marriage seems 
appropriate and sensible.”243 
This view, however, contradicts the commonly accepted principle 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is “irrelevant to the question of 
whether one state must recognize another state’s marriage.”244  When 
dealing with ordinary statutory acts, the Supreme Court has decided that 
                                                          
 238.  961 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. 
 239.  See, e.g., id. at 1205; Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 473. 
 240.  See Sanders, supra note 2, at 97 n. 19.  
 241.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 242.  320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943), modified in part by Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 
U.S. 261, 268–69 (1980) (cited portion still in force). 
 243.  Sanders, supra note 2, at 96. 
 244.  Id.  
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one state is not required to “substitute the statutes of other states for its 
own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is 
competent to legislate.”245  Because marriage laws are reserved 
exclusively to the states,246 commentators have consistently treated 
marriage laws as acts not subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.247  
The federal courts have never weighed in on this issue.248 
The argument in favor of invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
to strike DOMA § 2, as well as all mini-DOMAs, explains that, unlike 
workers’ compensation laws, drivers’ licenses, and fishing licenses, 
which are all treated as “Acts” not subject to comity principles,249 
marriage licensing involves a fundamental right protected by the U.S. 
Constitution.250  The Supreme Court has on many occasions singled out 
marriage as a distinct and special right.251  There is no reason to believe 
that the Court, if given the chance, would not agree that uniformity in 
marriage is exactly the kind of uniformity the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause was intended to promote.252  A lack of uniformity in marriage 
licensing can have disastrous results.253  For example, a same-sex couple 
with joint parenting rights in one state may have those parental rights 
torn asunder by moving across state lines to a state with a mini-DOMA 
that invalidates the marriage.254  One half of a couple seeking a divorce 
could relocate to a state with a mini-DOMA which would view the 
marriage as void, even absent a divorce decree.255  The list of 
complications goes on and suggests that this lack of uniformity will have 
disastrous consequences for same-sex couples seeking to relocate—
                                                          
 245.  Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. 
Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939) and citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 
U.S. 797, 818–19 (1985)).  See also, e.g., Sanders, supra note 2, at 96; Mark D. Rosen, Why the 
Defense of Marriage Act is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the 
Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 933 
(2006). 
 246.  Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980). 
 247.  See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 2, at 96; Rosen, supra note 245, at 933, 985. 
 248.  Sanders, supra note 2, at 97 & n. 19. 
 249.  See id. at 104 (discussing the differences between public acts and marriage laws). 
 250.  See id. at 105–06. 
 251.  See id. at 104–05. 
 252.  See id. at 104. 
 253.  See id. at 95–96. 
 254.  See id. at 95–96 (“mini-DOMAs effectively nullify the marriages of same-sex couples who 
migrate from one state to another”). 
 255.  See id.  
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which is exactly what the Full Faith and Credit Clause was meant to 
prevent.256 
With very few federal cases addressing the issue of the applicability 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to marriages, it is anyone’s guess as 
to whether the Supreme Court would entertain such an argument.  Many 
federal courts addressing the validity of DOMA § 2 and mini-DOMAs 
since United States v. Windsor have found a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.257  Federal courts have also found violations of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.258  None of these 
courts addressed the role of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the 
discussion.  Thus, it is unlikely that the comity issue will reach the 
Supreme Court before the Court eventually strikes DOMA § 2 and rules 
state mini-DOMAs similarly unconstitutional on Equal Protection Clause 
grounds. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is an excellent, although 
unpredictable, vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of mini-
DOMAs that force courts to deny an otherwise applicable marital 
privilege to a same-sex couple.  Promoting uniformity is at the heart of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause,259 and the lack of uniformity concerning 
the recognition of marital privileges for same-sex couples is exactly what 
prevents them from receiving the full rights, privileges, and benefits of 
marriage that the state of their marriage celebration intended them to 
have.  A same-sex couple validly married in one state cannot enjoy the 
full privileges and benefits of that marriage—“the best solace of human 
existence”260—because the marital privileges to which the couple is 
entitled in their state of celebration may not be applied by a state with a 
mini-DOMA because of their gender.  Their most prudent course of 
action is to not fully utilize the privileges extended to them because they 
may later be forced to reveal confidences in foreign courtrooms to the 
detriment of their spouses.  A state with a mini-DOMA is preventing 
same-sex couples from fully enjoying their rights when not even located 
                                                          
 256.  Id. at 110. 
 257.  E.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 480 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, Bostic v. Shaefer, 
Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-
CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *1, 7 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014); Bishop v. United States ex rel. 
Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003, 14-
5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 
2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 258.  E.g., Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 484; Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1216. 
 259.  See Sanders, supra note 2, at 110. 
 260.  Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839). 
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within the state with the mini-DOMA.  That state is reaching across its 
borders to strip citizens from foreign states that do recognize same-sex 
marriages of their rights.  Surely, this is the type of uniformity the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause was meant to protect.  Thus, it should be invoked 
to challenge the constitutionality of DOMA and mini-DOMAs. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The current divide across states over marriage equality results in the 
unfortunate side-effect of chilling the exercise of benefits associated with 
marital privileges by married same-sex couples.  Specifically, same-sex 
couples may not fully engage in the intimate and confidential 
communications associated with marriage under stressful circumstances 
without the certainty that those confidences will not later be revealed 
under court order in a foreign jurisdiction which refuses to recognize the 
marital privilege for a same-sex couple whose marriage the foreign court 
rules invalid.  This reality allows those states with prohibitions on same-
sex marriage—or mini-DOMAs—to curtail the rights of same-sex 
couples residing in foreign jurisdictions, frustrating the intent of the 
jurisdiction granting the couple all the rights and benefits of marriage. 
The only way to resolve this inequity in recognition of marital 
privileges is to provide certainty in marital privileges.  Because a 
uniform marital privilege is not a viable option, the only way to provide 
such certainty is through court intervention striking § 2 of DOMA and 
mini-DOMAs as violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
respectively.  The best arguments for challenging these laws are the 
Equal Protection and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.  Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the unequal application of marital privileges to same-
sex spouses fails the rational basis test.  Under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, mini-DOMAs deny the comity required by the Constitution. 
Court intervention to render DOMA § 2 and mini-DOMAs 
unconstitutional will require states considering the applicability of 
marital privileges to find a valid marriage on which to base the privilege, 
even in the case of a same-sex marriage.  Predictability in defining a 
valid marriage across jurisdictions will provide the certainty needed to 
encourage same-sex couples to fully exercise the rights and privileges of 
marriage, including the protection of confidentiality in intimate spousal 
communications and the freedom from testifying adversely to one’s 
spouse. 
 
